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Abstract 
Being increasingly complex devices, smart TVs are becoming more capable and have the potential to receive, 
store, process and transmit considerable amounts of personal data. These capabilities also represent several 
diverse attack surfaces potentially rendering these devices highly vulnerable. The emergence and high adoption 
rate of smart TVs have been drawing notable interest from security researchers and industry. We utilise an attack 
surface area-based approach to assess the security of two modern smart TVs from different vendors and describe 
some of the possible multi-surface attacks that can be carried out against these devices. 
Keywords 
IoT security, smart TV, inter-protocol exploitation 
INTRODUCTION 
Integration of modern technologies and Internet connectivity has been driving the evolution of once isolated 
traditional television (TV) sets into connected and feature rich living room hubs. The so-called “smart” TVs 
incorporate various elements to offer an interactive, more engaging and personalised experience. In addition to 
standard viewing features, these devices generally support local media playback, web browsing, streaming of 
external media, support for voice commands as well as consumption of third party applications and content 
services. Gartner (2012) state that there will be around 200 million smart TVs sold in 2016 and at least 1 in 8 
Australians now have a smart TV in their home (Roy Morgan Research, 2015). The rich feature set provided by 
these devices represents a diverse range of potential attack surfaces. Given two smart TVs by different 
manufacturers, we examine some of these surfaces and discuss potential attack scenarios. 
RELATED WORK 
A smart TV is a device that integrates traditional television technology with a computing platform (Sutherland, 
Read, & Xynos, 2014). Arguably, smart TVs can be classified as Internet of Things (IoT) devices. In our study, 
we employ the definition by Whitehouse (2014) who describes IoT as “a global network infrastructure, linking 
physical and virtual objects through the exploitation of data capture and communication capabilities…” 
assuming data capture, event transfer, network connectivity and interoperability as its key characteristics. As 
discussed later, devices examined by us were found to exhibit all of these traits. 
IoT Security 
The business-oriented IoT application space often dictates the need for cost-effective business models that can 
result in overlooking security to reduce time to market and lower the production expenditure. IoT security is an 
active research area with a number of unaddressed challenges. According to Suo, Wan, Zou, and Liu (2012), 
these challenges emerge because: 
1. IoT extends the traditional internet using a variety of established and emerging protocols; 
2. Nodes in IoT deployments have internet connectivity; and 
3. Nodes are also potentially interconnected. 
Being possibly inter-linked extensions of the Internet, IoT deployments present an expanded attack surface. This 
notion is made worse by the fact that large-scale deployments consist of an array of diverse nodes, which are 
often characterised by limited computational resources and lack of convenient physical access (Gang, Zeyong, & 
Jun, 2011). From the data handling perspective, privacy issues represent a significant concern, with the European 
Commission stating that, in the first instance, IoT deployments are unlikely to be designed to meet the relevant 
requirements, such as the right of deletion and the right to be forgotten (Whitehouse, 2014). Finally, from the 
legislation perspective, there is a need for new and improved regulation reflecting the unique challenges of IoT 
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through a “heterogeneous and differentiated legal framework” that is able to handle the global and ubiquitous 
nature of IoT (Weber, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 1. Layered IoT Security Architecture. Based on Suo et al. (2012, pp. 648-649). 
To systemise the diversity of inherent security challenges, a number of researchers described similar IoT security 
architectures with one example presented in Figure 1 (Heer et al., 2011; Jing, Vasilakos, Wan, Lu, & Qiu, 2014; 
Suo et al., 2012). However, it may not be practical to structure applied security assessments based on a high-
level architecture alone.  
 
 
Figure 2. IoT Attack Surface Areas. Based on Miessler (2015). 
To support and inform practical assessments, the community behind the Open Web Application Security Project 
(OWASP) introduced the “IoT Top 10” list of common security issues (OWASP, 2015). The listing has been 
subsequently complemented by an array of fifteen IoT attack surface areas to facilitate a universal approach, as 
shown in Figure 2 (Miessler, 2015). Thus, we structure our study based on a subset of these areas. We also 
propose an additional item called “Development Tools” to reflect the fact that examination of developer 
resources can provide its own benefits, as discussed later in this paper. 
Smart TV Security 
Grattafiori and Yavor (2013) provide a comprehensive analysis of Samsung smart TV security and demonstrate 
how specific components such as firmware, applications and web browser can be easily attacked in a targeted 
fashion due to a “systemic problem within the platform”. Lee and Kim (2013) provide a vendor-agnostic 
overview, labelling smart TVs an ideal target for surveillance activities. However, the TV does not need 
necessarily to be compromised to enable surveillance, as the feature may already be present by design. For 
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instance, certain smart TVs have been found to be sending voice data to a third party service over an 
unencrypted channel for the stated purpose of voice recognition (Munro, 2015).  
Oren and Keromytis (2014) describe a method of abusing the Hybrid Broadcast-Broadband Television (HbbTV) 
standard to inject malicious payloads into the TV content stream, which is rendered by a web browser engine. 
The discussed method could be used to mount a large-scale attack targeting in excess of 20,000 devices from a 
single location for under US$450. Unfortunately, this research was dismissed as being potentially insignificant 
due to stated reasons of difficulty of wide scale deployment and monetization of such an attack. 
Smart TV Forensics 
The feature set provided by smart TVs has the potential to facilitate misuse, making the device a possible yet 
neglected source of digital evidence. Guidance on forensic examination of smart TVs at the time of writing 
appears to be scarce and the process generally requires access to specialised expertise and hardware (Sutherland 
et al., 2014). Possibly the most comprehensive guide at the time of writing is provided by Boztas, Riethoven, and 
Roeloffs (2015). The guide suggests that smart TVs should be treated like any other embedded system and 
describes a number of acquisition methods. However, as the study is limited to the specific make and model, and 
as such additional research in this area is still needed. 
Problem Statement and Significance 
Smart TVs can act as intermediaries between the Internet and the local home or corporate network. A 
compromised device could be used to mount additional attacks against other smart appliances and traditional 
devices. In a surveillance context, the camera and microphone of a compromised smart TV could be used to 
observe residents or workers – an activity that was found to be the biggest fear of a smart TV owner (Lee & 
Kim, 2013).  
At the time of writing, most of the research into smart TV forensics and security is based on Samsung devices, 
possibly due to their popularity and rootkit availability (SamyGo Forum, 2013). Yet, other vendors use different 
technology components meaning that specific findings may not be universally applicable. For example, modern 
LG devices are based on a derivative of the open source webOS operating system (LG Electronics, 2015c). 
Panasonic smart TVs manufactured between 2010 and 2014 are based on the proprietary Viera Connect 
platform, which utilises cloud-based application delivery model and requires an active Internet connection to 
provide most of its features (Lane, 2013). Our hypothesis is that we can use open-source security assessment 
tools and commodity hardware components to identify potential attack scenarios for smart TVs other than 
Samsung. 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
The following materials were used to complete the assessment: 
 Panasonic Viera THL50ET60A smart TV 
 LG 55UF770T smart TV 
 Apple Macbook Pro running Kali 2.0 penetration testing distribution 
 Asus Nexus 7 running Android 4.4.4 with Kali NetHunter 1.2 mobile penetration testing distribution 
 TP-LINK TL-WN722N USB wireless network interface card (NIC) 
In order to achieve the required depth of assessment for the research at hand we focussed scope to that with the 
greatest potential impact. Additionally, some areas of scope were eliminated due to the non-availability of 
agreements required to access certain vendor and third party APIs. Subsequently, we concentrated our efforts on 
the following areas: 
 Device physical interfaces 
 Device network services 
 Ecosystem communication 
 Mobile application 
 Network traffic 
 Development tools 
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Figure 3. Assessment test bed based on the described materials. 
We utilised a mix of open-source tools and commodity hardware to create the assessment test bed presented in 
Figure 3. We provide an outline of the examination approach for every area in Table 1. The undertaken research 
was conducted using a quasi-experimental methodology with empirical components. This methodology was 
selected, as the nature of IoT devices is that they require data from external sources that are out of the author’s 
control. While steps were taken to mitigate the impact of these variables it is not possible to control all of them 
due to the connected nature of such devices. 
 
Table 1. Assessment approach details for every examined surface area. 
Surface Area Method Tools Notes 
Device physical 
interfaces 
Deliver a Human Interface Device 
(HID) payload in an attempt to 
initiate a background terminal 
session with a reverse TCP shell. 
HID Ducky Script Attack 
using Kali NetHunter 1.2 and 
wired USB connection to 
smart TV. 
The examination was limited 
to external USB storage ports. 
Device network 
services 
Enumerate and fingerprint 
available network services using 
common network reconnaissance 
techniques. 
Nmap (6.49BETA4) and 
OpenVAS (8.0). 
 
Ecosystem 
communication / 
Network traffic 
Intercept and inspect network 
payloads and metadata exchanged 
between devices and their cloud 
ecosystems and other endpoints. 
Mitmproxy (0.13), tcpdump 
(4.6.2), Wireshark (1.12.6) 
and Mana toolkit (20150707). 
Encrypted payloads were not 
examined due to inability to 
install custom trusted 
certificates. 
Mobile application Intercept and inspect network 
payloads and metadata exchanged 
between the device and remote 
control mobile app. 
tcpdump (4.6.2), Wireshark 
(1.12.6) and Mana toolkit 
(20150707). 
Traffic was captured en 
masse for subsequent 
analysis. 
Development tools Examine the provided device 
emulator and software 
development kit (SDK). 
LG webOS TV Emulator 
(2.0.0), LG webOS TV CLI 
Due to lack of equivalent 
tools for Panasonic devices, 
only the LG emulator was 
examined. 
Network Capture Collection and Analysis 
Where network traffic interception and inspection are involved, the analysis was performed on the basis of 
captured packet files for each of the following scenarios: 
 Ecosystem communication / Network traffic – sequential action execution (refer to the relevant Results 
section for action description) resulting in lg-network.pcap and pana-network.pcap. 
 Mobile application – interaction with two remote control mobile apps for each TV (refer to the relevant 
Results section for app description) resulting in respective lg-remote-*.pcap and pana-remote-*.pcap 
files. 
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The overview of the captured packet traces is provided in Table 2. Subsequent analysis was performed with the 
aid of both graphical and command-line packet inspection tools available as part of the Wireshark suite of 
utilities. For the remainder of the areas, exploratory analysis was performed to determine feasible attack 
scenarios that could drive future investigations. 
 
Table 2. Overview of captured pcap files used in assessing ecosystem communication / network traffic and 
mobile application surface areas. 
File name Number of 
packets 
File size (bytes) Data size 
(bytes) 
Capture duration 
(seconds) 
Average packet 
size (bytes) 
lg-network.pcap 92222 89269227 87793651 992.667771 951.98 
lg-remote-1.pcap 9691 4357427 4202347 151.865922 433.63 
lg-remote-2.pcap 6196 2394510 2295350 206.704788 370.46 
pana-network.pcap 10100 7261925 7100301 634.134583 703 
pana-remote-1.pcap 5522 2762434 2674058 391.037781 484.26 
pana-remote-2.pcap 6597 3192444 3086868 365.395744 467.92 
RESULTS 
We discuss our findings in the subsequent sections dedicated to each analysed surface area. 
Device Physical Interfaces 
Both devices undergoing evaluation had multiple USB ports capable of interfacing with external media storage 
devices and input peripherals such as keyboards. Therefore, we assumed potential susceptibility of these 
interfaces to Human Interface Device (HID) attacks such as those described by Crenshaw (2011). Kali 
NetHunter 1.2 supports Rubber Ducky syntax-based payloads that encapsulate series of keystrokes interpreted 
by the target system as keyboard input. While there are various ready-to-use payloads available, most of them 
are tailored to Windows or OS X-based systems. Knowing that our smart TVs are Linux-based, we attempted a 
number of payloads aimed at initiating a background terminal session with reverse TCP shell without success. 
We observed that both TVs reacted to these payloads in similar fashion by demonstrating rapid channel or 
application screen switches. A sample payload is presented in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. Kali NetHunter 1.2 HID Ducky Script Editor screen showing one of the delivered payloads.  
Device Network Services 
Smart TVs are discoverable on the network to enable media streaming and remote control by mobile 
applications. This functionality is achieved by exposing network services that could be enumerated using 
standard reconnaissance tools. In addition to network service discovery, we performed vulnerability scans based 
on identified ports, but the resulting findings were deemed insignificant. We categorised the discovered services 
into: 
1. Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) endpoints, and 
2. Ancillary services 
 
The former enables standard services such as media rendering and remote control, whereas the latter is 
responsible for provisioning of specialised services, such as web page debugging. UPnP is a well-established 
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standard that is prone to known security issues, such as common misconfiguration or the ability to exploit 
specific implementations of the underlying libraries (Hemel, 2006; Moore, 2013). An example of an observed 
UPnP profile description is shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Subset of information available via UPnP service profile description at 
http://<device_ip>:55000/nrc/ddd.xml for Panasonic smart TV.  
 
Given that UPnP should not be configured to be accessible externally, discovery and exploitation of these 
services requires presence on the internal network. While such actions may result in being able to send arbitrary 
control commands to the device, we anticipate that targets of higher significance would be pursued in that 
scenario. Nevertheless, information that can be obtained from UPnP endpoints can be used for device 
fingerprinting as various unique identifiers and device capabilities including the list of installed applications can 
be enumerated via endpoint interaction. 
Ecosystem Communication and Network Traffic 
Given that smart TVs rely on Internet access to enable most of the online features, we expected to encounter a 
diverse set of packet traces of potential significance during the capture experiments. To facilitate the collection, 
we executed a standardised set of sequential actions on each device: 
 Switch through 10 channels sequentially 
 Access the app store, install, use and remove an app (a weather app) 
 Insert a USB storage device and play a media file 
 Use voice control commands (LG smart TV only) 
The high-level view of the resulting traffic flows is presented in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. SSL and HTTP-based (plaintext) traffic flow statistics based on a pre-defined set of device interactions 
for Panasonic (left) and LG (right) smart TV. The Y scale shows the number of packets using a 𝑙𝑜𝑔 scale. SSL-
based interactions are shown in red. 
Both devices rely on encrypted communications for the majority of interactions with their ecosystems. We 
observed exceptions in these cases - Internet connectivity check, latest firmware version check and licence server 
communication (LG only). However, respective payloads were represented by binary data decoded from base64 
and would require prior knowledge about their structures for interpretation. Other plain-text traffic was observed 
during: 
 Fetching of user interface elements (assets) and HTML-based application resources and data 
 Fetching of HbbTV content for Australian digital TV channels 
In the latter case, we spotted HbbTV content being served in plain text from a centralised Freeview Plus service 
that was launched in Australia in late 2014 (Healey, 2014). Both cases are equally significant, because they can 
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be exploited to perform JavaScript injection attacks into a browser-like execution environment. We describe a 
possible practical scenario later in this section. 
Mobile Application 
To diversify device control options, a user can choose to install a mobile app on their iOS or Android device. 
The summary of our examination of these apps for each TV is presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Findings associated with remote control mobile apps. 
Description LG Panasonic 
Mobile apps LG TV Plus, webOS Magic Remote. Panasonic TV Remote, Panasonic TV 
Remote 2. 
Device discovery and 
communication method 
UDP multicast discovery followed by HTTP-
based UPnP endpoint communication using 
XML payloads. WebSockets-based 
communication for screen pointer controls. 
UDP multicast discovery followed by 
HTTP-based UPnP endpoint communication 
using XML payloads. 
Pairing requirement  Initial pairing triggers a 3-digit PIN displayed 
on the smart TV screen. The correct PIN 
needs to be supplied by the client to complete 
the pairing while the message is being 
displayed. 
Not required. 
TV control capabilities TV remote equivalent with keyboard input. TV remote equivalent with keyboard input. 
Ancillary capabilities Browser screen sharing, media sharing, 
application enumeration and launch, TV 
software version check and update 
deployment (LG TV Plus only). 
Browser screen sharing, media sharing, 
application enumeration and launch (TV 
Remote 2 only). 
Thus, clients can use XML payload replay attacks to execute control commands on the TV. Fortunately, the 
pairing process employed by the LG TV addresses this issue for untrusted clients. 
Development Tools 
Both devices allow installation of third party apps to personalise the TV and each vendor provides an app store 
for developers to distribute their apps. To aid the development process, various tools are offered to the 
community, including development guides, Application Programming Interface (API) references, sample code 
and, in the case of LG webOS, device emulators (LG Electronics, 2015d; Panasonic, 2015). We examined the 
available developer resources and focussed on the LG webOS 2.0.0 TV emulator as we expected it to be a 
reasonable representation of emulated physical devices. 
 
Figure 7. Modified sample JavaScript service containing the reverse shell payload (top) and output of simple 
commands executed in the resulting shell (bottom). 
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While the emulator is limited in its capabilities, it allows testing of all application types, including packaged 
applications, hosted applications and JavaScript services. We successfully tested the ability to initiate a reverse 
TCP shell to an arbitrary host and port by leveraging standard libraries available for the implementation of 
JavaScript services, as shown in Figure 7. While it may not be feasible to embed this functionality in a real 
application due to the possibility of being detected during the submission process, a malicious party could 
attempt to employ various evasion techniques to bypass the quality assurance controls, especially if mostly static 
analysis is used. 
Furthermore, emulator app deployment is achieved over SSH. We were able to gain emulator shell access 
directly for an unprivileged account. We were also able to read the emulator root password hash, meaning that in 
theory one could obtain full access to the emulator given sufficient time and computational resources. We also 
suspect that it may be possible to achieve successful privilege escalation by tailoring, cross compiling and 
executing a targeted payload for the identified kernel version as an alternative to root password cracking. Even 
with unprivileged access, an interested party is able to analyse the local file system and service configuration 
files. Nevertheless, the LG device emulator could be used to gain additional insights into the possible inner 
workings of emulated smart TVs. 
Targeting Multiple Areas Via Inter-protocol Communication 
Smart TVs come with a fully-fledged web browser, however the exposure of this to the user is dependent on the 
device in question. Web browsers available on desktop and mobile platforms represent an attractive attack 
surface (Alcorn, Frichot, & Orru, 2014). Packages installed on smart TVs are not necessarily any different, 
because they are based on commonly available open source web rendering engines such as WebKit (Mautilus, 
n.d.). In the case of smart TVs, web browsers are also used to render apps, which are built using standard 
HTML5 technologies (LG Electronics, 2015b). An attacker could leverage existing browser exploitation tools 
such as the Browser Exploitation Framework (BeEF) by Alcorn (2014) and gain TV browser control in the 
following scenarios: 
 Compromise of a centralised content delivery service (e.g. Freeview Plus) to deliver JavaScript 
payloads encapsulated inside HbbTV content 
 JavaScript payload injection into a TV-based app that fetches external resources  
 JavaScript payload injection into a hosted app 
 
The last scenario is the least complex and can be easily demonstrated. A hosted app is an external HTML page 
that is launched inside a browser-equivalent application execution environment. While destination pages of 
hosted apps may be inspected during the store submission process, the provider can easily modify them after 
they have been accepted. An example of a scenario where an attacker has modified the hosted app source to 
inject the BeEF hook is shown in Figure 8. We were able to verify this scenario for both devices using the 
provided application development tools. 
 
Figure 8. A possible attack scenario against an LG webOS smart TV using a hosted application injected with 
BeEF. 
In the case of LG, we found that the execution environment for hosted apps appears identical to that used for 
TV-based apps, providing access to certain system services that can be used to access potentially sensitive 
information (LG Electronics, 2015a). Specifically, we were able to obtain the TV model name and firmware 
version details, the internal IP address of the device, Service Set Identifier (SSID) of the associated wireless 
access point and the IP address of the utilised Domain Name Server (DNS). In combination, this information 
could be used to mount other attacks with the potential to provide access to network on which the TV is located. 
Such access could be leveraged through interception of wireless traffic, firewall bypass technique’s (via UPNP 
or NAT busting). Considering the unencrypted information leaks previously discussed this could lead to an 
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attacker listening in on conversations that occur within range of the device as well as discovering the viewing 
habits of the users. These scenarios are limited examples relating only to data that can be gathered from the 
Smart TV itself, access to the local network has significant further potential for breaches of privacy. 
For example, based on advertised retail prices, the model number could be used to infer the socioeconomic status 
of the residents of the associated dwelling. Network SSID could be used to geolocate the access point using a 
public access point location database such as WiGLE.net (Wigle.net, 2015). Such information has the potential 
to facilitate the targeting of other crimes such as burglary or financial offenses. In the second case the Smart TV 
potentially provides both identification of high value targets and means to access the network in order to 
intercept banking and other financial transactions. A carefully crafted in-app popup mimicking native TV user 
interface could be presented to the user asking them to re-enter their wireless credentials for the discovered SSID 
due to a problem with network connectivity.  
CONCLUSION 
We followed a surface-area based approach to IoT device security assessment to examine the potential security 
issues of two smart TVs from different vendors and proposed the inclusion of an additional element in the 
framework. We inspected device physical interfaces, device network services, ecosystem communication, 
network traffic, mobile applications and development tools using a test bed facilitated by open-source tools and 
commodity hardware and identified a number of possible attack vectors. We conclude that inter-protocol 
communication and script injection into a browser-based execution environment powering the smart TV user 
experience provides an easy target that can be attacked to access device information not generally available in a 
standard browser environment. In the future, we plan to conduct a more thorough examination of the app 
execution environment and related attack scenarios. 
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